Does Aggressive Investment in Technology Lower Expenses in the Life Insurance Industry? by Logan, Franklin A., II
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
4-1-1997
Does Aggressive Investment in Technology Lower
Expenses in the Life Insurance Industry?
Franklin A. Logan II
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For
more information, please contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Logan, Franklin A. II, "Does Aggressive Investment in Technology Lower Expenses in the Life Insurance Industry?" (1997). Student
Work. 1659.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/1659
DOES AGGRESSIVE INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY LOWER 
EXPENSES IN THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY?
A Thesis 
Presented to the 
Department of Economics 
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College 
University of Nebraska 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
University of Nebraska at Omaha
by
Franklin A. Logan, II 
April, 1997
UMI Number: EP73499
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
Disssrt&ion RubJisMng
UMI EP73499
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Pro
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
THESIS ACCEPTANCE
Does Aggressive Investment in Technology Lower Expenses 
in the Life Insurance Industry?
By Franklin A. Logan, II
Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College, 
University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree Master of Arts, University 
of Nebraska at Omaha
Committee
P-Mua. t
Arthur Diamond Economics
/  / ')
Graham Mitenko Finance
Kim Sosin, Chair Economics
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Mark Schreier, FSA, of the Woodmen of the World Life Insurance 
Society for his help in organizing the financial data and weighting the premiums.
Also, Larry Underwood of LOMA for his help reviewing and approving the survey that 
was sent to LOMA Systems Committee members.
The most help and support, however, came from my thesis committee. They were Kim 
Sosin and Arthur Diamond of the Economics Department and Graham Mitenko of the 
Finance Department, all at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. I greatly appreciate 
their time and patience.
Table of Contents
I .
II. 
ill.
IV.
v.
VI .
VII .
VIII .
IX.
Appendix I . 
Appendix II. 
Bibliography
Introduction 
Economics Literature 
Insurance Specific Literature 
General Literature 
Data
A . The Survey
B. Financial Data 
The Model 
Results
Analysis of Results
Conclusion
The Survey
Tables
1DOES AGGRESSIVE INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY LOWER EXPENSES 
IN THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY?
I . INTRODUCTION
By the nature of their business, life insurance firms 
are conservative in their investments in securities, bonds, 
and real estate. A life insurance contract can span a 
century, making the long term survival of the firm 
imperative. Conservative investments are necessary in this 
environment and government regulation reinforces this 
approach.
The conservative approach holds for investments in 
technology. Information systems professionals in the 
industry appear to believe that there is an optimum time to 
invest in new technology. Information services managers 
seldom take the risk of purchasing technology that is still 
experimental. It can be costly in time and money and the 
risk of failure is high. On the other hand, the managers do 
not want to be conservative to the point of reducing their 
competitiveness.
The hypothesis of this paper is that firms that time 
their technology investments correctly have more favorable
2expense levels. The aggressiveness of technology 
investment, for this paper, will be measured by purchases of 
four key softwares used in the life insurance industry.
They are:
1. Personal computer network software. Definitely a 
dominant software, networks link personal computers for 
file and resource sharing.
2. Relational data bases. This group of softwares, 
considered dominant by Robert G. Fichman and Chris F. 
Kemerer, groups data in tables, rather than 
hierarchical files, that make access and cross 
referencing more efficient (Fichman and Kemerer 1993,
13) .
3. Expert systems. These softwares, which are less 
dominant, are used for decision making. In the life 
insurance industry expert systems are used for 
underwriting and claims decisions.
4. Work flow softwares. These softwares are 
generally used with image technology (document storage 
on optical disks). The dominance level is similar to 
expert systems. Workflow softwares are used to
3automatically distribute work with a minimum flow of
paper.
One hundred one life insurance firms were surveyed to 
determine their use of the above four softwares. The survey 
contained questions about the timing of investments in the 
four softwares. Questionnaires were sent to middle level 
information services professionals who were members of 
Systems Committees for the Life Office Management 
Association (LOMA). Aggressiveness was based on:
1. The managers' self ranking.
2. The year the firms purchased the first software.
3. The number of the four softwares owned.
A review of the literature follows which is divided 
into three major categories: economics literature,
insurance specific literature, and general literature. Each 
section ends with a brief summary. Next the data are 
described which consist of survey data and financial data.
A description of the regression model follows with the 
results. Finally, the results are analyzed and tied back to
the literature.
4II. ECONOMICS LITERATURE
The large amount of economics literature on technology 
adoption can be categorized in many ways. For this paper, 
the literature has been classified into four perspectives. 
They are (1) the demand-pull, supply-push debate, (2) 
appropriability, (3) timing in business cycles, and (4) firm 
characteristics.
A. Demand-pull, supply-push
This body of literature has little relationship to this 
study. The debate, as with most literature on technology 
adoption, focuses on manufacturing industries, and to a 
lesser extent, on hardware. Earlier literature was focused 
on the demand for innovations while later literature 
contends that demand, while important, has been overextended 
in its role as a factor in innovation development.
Demand-pull forces include excess demand for a firm's 
products, consumer demand for new products, competitive 
pressures, or trials in other industries or countries 
(Mowery 1979, passim). Excess demand is of little concern 
to a life insurance firm as long as the home office can 
support new sales. Insurance is a valuable service but
5there is little physical output associated with it making it 
relatively easy to react to increased demand. Consumer 
demand could be a factor in the introduction of a new 
insurance product as could competitive pressures. The 
important factors are the calculations and processing 
necessary to issue the policy. New software may be needed 
for the introduction of a new product. However, the focus 
of this study is the effect of timing of adoption on 
operating costs. The software used in this study for 
measuring innovativeness is only indirectly related to the 
final product of a life insurance firm.
The supply side of this body of literature focuses on 
markets and infrastructure, the rate of technological 
advance, and technological paradigms. The supply side 
involves the establishment of diffusion agencies, or 
sponsors of an innovation, and strategies for the diffusion 
(Brown 1981, 281). In the current study, this would be more
closely related to the software developer than the insurance 
firm purchasing it.
6B. Appropriating returns from innovation
If there is a consensus in the literature, it is that 
different industries behave differently with respect to 
appropriating returns from innovations- Zvi Griliches 
argued that the return from research on hybrid corn was 
huge, but very little of it was appropriated by farmers or 
seed corn firms (Griliches 1958, 430)- Nevertheless, the 
research was done. Richard C. Levin, et. al., argue that 
appropriability is necessary for research to pay off and the 
public benefits from this appropriability (Richard Levin, 
e t . al. 1987, 783). Appropriability leads to more 
innovation.
Appropriability implies barriers to entry allowing a 
firm to gain above normal profits from an innovation. This 
concept again applies more to the software developer, the 
actual innovator, than the insurance firm. In comparison to 
the hybrid corn model, the insurance firm is equivalent to 
the farmer while the software developer is equivalent to the 
seed corn firm. While the insurance firm may find 
appropriability in an innovative insurance product or 
possibly in software developed inside the firm, it is the 
software developer who will appropriate above normal
7profits, if any, on packaged software. This is simply 
because there are no barriers to installing the software.
It is readily available off the shelf as is seed corn. 
Customization of the software, for example to introduce an 
innovative insurance product, would be necessary to 
appropriate any above normal profits on the software's 
installation. This is rare because any innovative insurance 
product is quickly copied by another firm. The idea of 
above normal profits being temporary is consistent with most 
microeconomics texts. Above normal profits are a signal for 
more firms to enter a new technology (Henderson 1986, 146- 
149). Nathan Rosenberg cites one of Joseph Schumpeter's 
assumptions that the first firms to innovate will reap the 
abnormal profits (Rosenberg 1976, 525-526; Schumpeter 1936, 
1-94, 128-156) . However, the pace of technological change 
may have more influence on the decision to adopt than the 
signal of abnormal profits. Depending on the rate of 
change', firms may not want to see their expensive new 
technology become obsolete too soon (Rosenberg 1976, 525) . 
This is doubly true since software is an expense item that 
is not depreciated over several years.
8C. Timing in relation to business cycles
When timing of adoption is mentioned in economic 
literature, it usually concerns the stage of the business 
cycle that is most conducive to adoption of innovations. 
Anita Benvignati discusses several theories concerning 
innovation in relation to the business cycle, concluding 
that there has been no consensus in the literature. Some 
evidence and literature points to the beginning of the cycle 
as most conducive to innovation while other evidence and 
literature points to the middle or end of the cycle 
(Benvignati 1982, 333). This body of literature has little 
connection with the current study. In many cases, the 
installation of a new software can span two business cycles 
before it is being used to its potential. The decision to 
purchase a software is made at a specific point in time, but 
the analysis leading up to the purchase covers months.
Timing relative to the business cycle is not a factor, or a 
very minor factor, in the timing of software purchases in 
the insurance industry.
D. Firm characteristics
This body of literature uses characteristics of firms 
to determine which firms are innovators and which firms are 
laggards. Firm size is the most tested of the 
characteristics but with mixed results. The common 
assumption is that large firms innovate more not because 
they are more progressive but because they have more 
equipment needing replacement (Mansfield 1968, 109) .
However, Sharon Levin, et. al., found that absolute firm 
size retards adoption (Sharon Levin et. al 1987, 17). Edwin
Mansfield found that in some industries, medium sized firms 
innovate more than either large or small firms. Even small 
firms, once they begin to adopt, diffuse innovations as fast 
as large firms(Mansfield 1968, 84-102). In the current 
study, firm size based on weighted premiums was tested.
Timothy Hannan and John McDowell tested the 
relationship between several firm characteristics and the 
probability that a firm will adopt an innovation. The 
Hannan-McDowell study is similar in some respects to the 
current study because it focused on one industry, banking. 
Like the current study the innovations involved were 
limited. The Hannan-McDowell study focused on just one
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innovation, automatic teller machines. One of the 
characteristics tested was firm size. In the test, the 
coefficients for firm size were significant and positive 
meaning that larger banks display a higher probability of 
adoption. The authors proposed several possible 
explanations for this conclusion including the existence of 
economies of scale in the use of ATMs, less risk exposure 
for larger banks, and a more positive attitude of managers 
of larger banks (Hannan 1984, passim).
Another variable tested by Hannan and McDowell was 
profit as measured by dividing net income by total assets. 
The test failed to find a positive impact of profits on the 
probability of adoption. The Hannan-McDowell study tested 
the impact of profits on innovation while the current study 
does the reverse, testing the impact of innovation on 
profitability in the form of expenses.
Other characteristics that were tested in this type of 
model by Mansfield, Levin, and others were firm growth, 
competition, consumer income, market wages, regulation, 
market growth, and prior adoptions, most with little 
significance. Hannan and McDowell did find a positive 
impact on innovation when markets were more concentrated and
when wages were higher. There was also a positive impact on 
innovation when certain regulations were tested, for example 
state limitations on bank branches.
These characteristics were not tested in this study of 
life insurance firms except for profitability as implied by 
an expense to weighted premium ratio. Many of the firm 
characteristics in other studies were based on local market 
and regulatory conditions. Insurance firms normally compete 
in national or regional markets. The target market for 
some firms is very narrow (for example firms that specialize 
in insuring teachers) but geographically widespread, making 
market information difficult to compile. Insurance firms 
are state regulated but market their product in several 
states. This would make information on regulatory 
conditions difficult to compile. The current study took a 
narrow look at the relationship between aggressive 
technology investment and expenses. Firm size was included 
in the study because of its importance in previous studies 
and the ease of sizing the firms by weighted premiums.
Wages could be a major factor in a firm's decision to 
adopt a new technology and insurance firms do compete 
locally for labor. However, this study does not address
12
that reason for adoption. Labor is the major factor in 
general insurance expense and a favorable expense to 
weighted premium ratio would probably be difficult without 
favorable labor costs.
E . SUMMARY
Keith Pavitt wrote that there are four types of users 
and developers of capital goods in manufacturing (Pavitt 
1984, 3 64). One of those types of capital goods producers is 
a specialized supplier. They are small firms with informal 
research and development. They have close contact with 
users. Improvements come quickly and easily.
Appropriability is high to these firms because reaction time 
to competitive pressures and technological change is short. 
Appropriability is based on research and development, 
secrecy, patents, and firm specific skills. Software 
developers can take advantage of these factors more 
efficiently than insurance firms. Kenneth Arrow argued that 
most learning takes place in capital goods industries, not 
in the firms using the capital goods. Production gives rise 
to problems and capital goods producers, over time, find 
solutions to those problems (Arrow 1962, 155-156).
13
Software development is not manufacturing, but these 
specialized suppliers have much in common with the firms 
that develop packaged software. Literature supporting this 
relationship between software users and the firms that 
develop their software is difficult to find or does not 
exist.
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III. INSURANCE SPECIFIC LITERATURE
A. Sidney E. Harris and Joseph L. Katz (198 8)
This was a study commissioned by LOMA (Harris and Katz, 
1988, passim). The main hypothesis was that the most 
profitable insurance firms will spend a higher proportion of 
non-interest operating expense on information technology. 
Similarly, the least profitable firms will spend less.
Data were gathered from 198 3 through 1986 from forty 
life insurers. The profitability measurement was the ratio 
of non-interest operating expense to premium income 
(operating expense ratio).
The "capital intensity" of information technology was 
measured by information technology expenses to non-interest 
operating expenses or information technology expense ratio 
(Harris 1988, 127). The firms were divided into quartiles 
by operating expense ratio. The authors found that the 
quartile with the most profitable firms was also the 
quartile with the most aggressive investors in information 
technology. The least profitable firms were the least 
aggressive technology investors. The capital intensity of 
information technology was 90% higher in the most aggressive 
firms than the most conservative. There were no time lags
15
involved. The odds were 97% that firms in the top 
performance quartile would not rank lowest in information 
technology expense ratio quartile. The authors did not 
claim causality, but they did find their hypotheses to be 
correct. Subsequently, management summary articles were 
published in Resource. LOMA7 s magazine.
B. Donald H. Bender (1986)
The purpose of Donald Bender's research was to find a 
method of evaluating total investment in information 
processing in the insurance industry (Bender 1986, passim). 
That method involved determining what proportion of total 
expense should be allocated to information processing.
Bender stated that problems arise with traditional 
cost-benefit analysis in information processing because 
benefits are too qualitative. User satisfaction becomes a 
major basis of evaluation.
The hypotheses were:
1. There is a range of information processing 
expenditures that will minimize the ratio of expenses 
to premiums.
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2. Firms with the least information processing 
expenditures will have the greatest overall expenses to 
premiums.
3. Not all funds allocated to information processing 
will result in favorable expense-premium impact.
Again, data were from LOMA. The procedure was to find
significant linear relationships between the expense- 
premium ratio and various information processing expenses. 
There were no time lags involved.
The results showed that there is an optimum range of 
information processing expenditures. The optimum 
information processing expense to total expense ratio is in 
the 15% to 25% range according to this 1986 study. The 
firms that have information expenditures outside that range 
have a less favorable expense to premium ratio. Concerning 
the third hypothesis, purchased hardware is a more effective 
investment than leased.
C. Sam Lubbe, Gary Parker, and Andrew Hoard (1994) 
This study examined the relationship of profitability 
and the level of information technology investment in South 
African life insurance firms (Lubbe, Parker and Hoard 1994, 
passim). It replicated the Harris study.
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The hypotheses were:
1. The most profitable firms will invest significantly 
more in information capital than the least.
2. Profitability performance is positively correlated 
with the degree of computerization.
Financial measurements were:
1. Non-interest operating expense to premium income 
(operating expense ratio).
2. Information technology expense to operating expense 
(information technology expense ratio).
The total population of South African life insurance 
firms was 23. Twenty questionnaires were sent and 12 
returned. Two were discarded for being incomplete, one was 
randomly discarded, and the remaining nine were divided into 
thirds. The thirds were ranked by a three year average of 
the operating expense ratio.
Both hypotheses were accepted. The most profitable 
firms spend more on information technology capital than the 
least. Also, profitability performance is positively 
correlated with the degree of computerization.
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D. Peter Weill and Margrethe Olson (1989)
The Weill-Olson study was not a statistical analysis 
but instead consisted of six case studies in five industries 
(Weill and Olson 1989, passim). Two of the firms were 
insurance firms. The authors saw little evidence linking 
information technology investment and firm performance.
Most firms, they found, take a cost analysis approach that 
is too narrow to actually determine whether information 
technology investment as a whole is profitable. Information 
technology performance analysis is usually based on 
individual projects. Most firms never perform a detailed, 
long term analysis of total information technology 
investment. Information technology investment should be 
tracked across projects on a broad base including hardware, 
software, people, communication, and training. It should be 
tracked against a base related to objectives or revenues.
E . SUMMARY
If there is a weakness in these'insurance industry 
studies, it may be in the measurement of income in the form 
of premiums. An expense to premium ratio is a valid and 
common method of comparing life insurance firm performance.
19
However, all premiums are not created equal. A new annuity 
contract has much lower expenses associated with it than a 
new life insurance contract. There are lower expenses 
associated with renewal premiums than first year premiums. 
There are lower expenses associated with group insurance 
premiums than individual insurance premiums. No two firms 
have the same mix of business. A way to solve this problem, 
although never perfect, is to weight the premiums by 
industry expense experience. This method of weighting 
premiums is a common way to compare expenses among life 
insurance firms. It provides a method of comparing firms 
with various business mixes.
20
IV. GENERAL LITERATURE
A. William L. Cron and Marion G. Sobol (1983)
Cron and Sobol researched the relationship between the 
level of computerization and performance (Cron and Sobol 
1983, passim). The objective was to determine if firms 
using more computerization have higher return ratios. 
Wholesalers in medical supplies were used because of the 
availability of good financial data. The article was 
published in 1983 with some of the data dating back to 1975. 
Few previous studies were found.
The level of computerization was based on the number of 
uses. Categories were accounting, management control, and 
environmental (inventory) uses. The four levels ranged from 
none to all three.
Financial measurements were:
1. Pretax profits/total assets
2. Pretax profits/net worth
3. Pretax profits/sales
4. Average five year sales growth
21
Conclusions:
1. Firms with computers were more likely to be high 
performers as measured by both profits-assets and 
profits-sales ratios.
2. Firms with extensive computer use were either very 
high or very low performers as measured by both
profits-assets and profits-sales ratios.
B. Robert G. Fichman and Chris F Kemerer (1993)
In the paper "Adoption of Software Engineering Process 
Innovations: The Case of Object Orientation," Robert
Fichman and Chris Kemerer discussed the risks of a firm 
being too aggressive in their software purchases (Fichman 
and Kemerer 1993, passim). Object orientation is the 
concept of using previously developed and tested software 
components to build new systems.
Installing a new software too early is risky. A new 
software may not reach the "critical mass" necessary to 
sustain the software as a dominant tool (Fichman and Kemerer 
1993, 11). If a firm commits to a software that does not
become dominant, problems that can occur include 
difficulties in hiring experienced staff, limited future
22
enhancements, limited complementary products, limited third 
party training opportunities, lack of accumulated wisdom in 
the industry, and loss of vendor support.
The authors examined through two perspectives whether 
object orientation will become dominant: diffusion of
innovations and the economics of technology standards. In 
the diffusion of innovations analysis, the relevant factors 
were relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, 
trialability (or the ability to test the software), and 
observability. The economics of technology standards test 
required increasing returns to adoption. Sources of 
increasing returns related to software were the ability to 
learn by using, positive network externalities (the number 
of other firms adopting the software), and technological 
interrelatedness (compatible products).
Other factors affecting adoption are irreversibility of 
investments, sponsorship by developers, expectations, and 
prior technology drag (the attachment to an earlier 
technology because of training and investment). The 
evolution of three previously developed softwares were 
examined on the above criteria: structured methodologies,
fourth generation languages, and relational databases. In
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"The Case of Object Orientation," the authors predicted that 
object orientation would never become dominant. According 
to this analysis, object orientation would provide a high 
relative advantage but its scores were low in tests for 
compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability. 
Of the three previous innovations only relational databases 
reached the required critical mass mostly because of 
persistent sponsors and high expectations. The authors' 
analysis was based on the evolution of relational databases 
and the relative failure, or at least slow adoption, of the 
other two. Whether object orientation becomes dominant or 
not, this study was an excellent analysis of how and when 
firms make the decision to jump to a new technology. It was 
valuable to this insurance industry study because it 
concentrated on the adoption of software rather than total 
technology investment.
C. Erik Brynjolfsson, Thomas Malone, Vijay Gurbaxani, 
and Ajit Kambil (1989)
Brynjolfsson et. al. stated that industrialized 
economies have entered a period of substantial 
organizational change ( Brynjolfsson et. al. 1989, passim).
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This is evidenced by decreases in firm size, a shift to 
externally provided services, less hierarchical management, 
a shift from mass production to flexible specialization, and 
increases in product and service variety.
The hypothesis is that information technology is an 
important determinant of economic organization as measured 
by firm size. Increases in information technology reduce 
firm size, vertical integration, and coordination costs.
This paper empirically investigates how information 
technology affects firm size. The study involves data from 
61 industries.
Regressions were done on the information technology- 
firm size relationship in eight industries. These were 
agriculture, durable goods manufacturing, transportation and 
utilities, finance, insurance, and real estate, mining, non­
durable goods manufacturing, wholesale and retail sales, and 
services.
The regressions showed the hypothesis to be correct.
Two possible, but unlikely, reasons that firm size is 
reduced through information technology are that technology 
reduces the proportion of hierarchical coordination needed 
within a vertically integrated firm and that technology
25
increases productivity. These explanations are not 
supported by previous literature. The most likely of the 
reasons cited was better market coordination resulting in a 
reduction in the scope of each individual firm's 
contribution to the value chain. Vertical integration is 
reduced and smaller firms do what integrated firms once did.
D. Vijay Gurbaxani and Seungjin Whang
Information technology has an impact on firm size and 
allocation of decision making authority (Gurbaxani and Whang 
1991, passim). The impact is based on agency theory and 
transactions cost. As decisions are pushed down the 
managerial hierarchy, the costs decrease of communicating 
up. Agency costs increase because goals of principals and 
agents become increasingly divergent. Decision rights in an 
organizational hierarchy should be located where the sum of 
the agency cost and transactions costs are at a minimum. 
Information technology can reduce agency and transactions 
costs and both internal and external coordination costs.
Information technology reduces transactions cost by 
creating ready access to market information and reducing 
contract costs. It reduces agency costs by better
26
monitoring techniques such as retail store scanners and 
advanced accounting methods.
Consumers of information technology prefer the dominant 
producer, causing a late mover advantage. The wait provides 
better technology and the accompanying organization to go 
with it at a lower price.
E. Joseph C. Panettieri (1995)
In this article in Information Week the author 
discusses the risks of early investment in software in the 
form of beta testing (Panettieri 1995, passim). This is the 
tradition of selected firms testing a new software or a new 
version of an existing software. Software publishers are 
moving the beta tests to an earlier stage in the development 
and in effect getting free labor from the testers.
The payoff for the firms is limited to having some 
input about software improvements. Risks include having 
unwanted files take up space on computers, systems problems 
outside the scope of the software caused by defects, and, 
most importantly, a staff that is spending too much time 
with the experimental software.
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F. David Blanchflower and Simon Burgess (1995) 
Blanchflower and Burgess attempt to answer the following 
questions:
1. Does new technology produce, a higher or lower 
employment growth rate?
2. What other factors are associated with success of 
new technology?
3. Which type of regulatory regime is better for 
growth from technology?
4. Is there any difference in the technology- 
employment growth relationship as the level of 
competition varies (Blanchflower and Burgess 1995, 
passim)?
The study compared differences and similarities of the 
effect of technology in two countries, the United Kingdom 
and Australia. The United Kingdom is a more open economy 
and deregulation has progressed further. Australia is 
traditionally more protected and regulated.
Strengths of the study include good profitability data, 
good market data, and similar questionnaires between the two 
countries. Weaknesses include a simultaneity problem
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stemming from omitted variables and lack of knowledge of the 
type of new equipment in each country.
Regressions were run both weighting for firm size and 
not weighting for firm size. Weighting for firm size shows 
that employment growth is higher in smaller, non-innovating 
firms.
The regressions show that growth is higher in non-union 
firms and, on average, employment growth is higher in 
technology introducing firms. Competition seems to be 
associated with increased employment growth in both 
countries. This result may be skewed because of a size or 
unionization effect. In the regressions, dummy variables 
were set up to control industry, age, unionization, 
increasing or decreasing demand, and competition.
The key result of this study is that the introduction 
of new technology in the weighted models is positively 
correlated with job growth. Experiments with unions and 
other dummy variables produced little change. Dummy 
variables were also used to indicate changed working 
practices rather that technological changes. Changes in 
working practices seemed to lower job growth while 
technology encouraged it. It did not appear that
technological effects proxied changes in working practices. 
New technology introduction raises employment growth by 2.5 
to 3.5 percent while new work practices lower it by 2 to 3 
percent per annum.
There seemed to be a strong negative correlation 
between unionization and employment growth. Changes in 
ownership, products, services, management, or organization 
achieved no significance.
G. Loren Hitt and Erik Brynjolfsson (1994)
Managers invest in technology expecting a substantial 
payoff but many studies present evidence that the payoff has 
not materialized (Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1994, passim). The 
goals of this study were to explain theoretical 
relationships among the principal measures of information 
technology's economic contribution and to apply diverse 
models to the same data set. Past research has been 
hampered by lack of firm level data. Data for this study 
were from the International Data Group, a new source.
The questions that are addressed are related but 
distinct. Have investments in information technology:
1. Increased productivity?
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2. Improved business profitability?
3. Created value for customers?
The first compares output to input. The second
concerns competitive advantage derived from information
technology. The third concerns the magnitude of benefits 
passed on to consumers. The study shows increased 
productivity and benefit to consumers but no empirical 
connection to profits or stock prices.
Concerning theories of competitive strategy, and most 
important for this insurance industry study, the authors 
test the hypothesis that information technology spending is 
uncorrelated with "supranormal" profits or stock prices. 
Technology will not create supranormal profits to a firm in 
an industry that has free access to that technology by all 
participants (Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1994, 4) . There is no 
reason to expect a firm spending more or less on information 
technology to have higher profits. Firms will spend an 
amount they consider normal in equilibrium but will not gain 
a competitive advantage from it. If barriers exist, there 
can be supranormal profits. But information technology may 
change barriers, thus changing profits in firms and 
industries. This is an ambiguous impact, however, and is
not sustainable. In previous studies, little correlation 
was found between information technology and profitability, 
and models used were low in predictive power. What little 
effects there were in this study indicate a slight negative 
effect on profit. Another hypothesis is that consumer 
surplus created by information technology is positive and 
growing over time.
The authors distinguish productivity from 
profitability. Productivity creates a larger pie where 
profitability redistributes the same size pie. Consumers 
keep the value created by information technology but not 
captured by firms. Productivity and consumer surplus 
increase together. This is not true of profitability.
H . Summary
If there is a pattern among these studies, it is that 
the studies associated with the insurance industry indicate 
a connection between profitability and the amount of 
investment in information technology. Studies outside the 
industry, in both economics and general literature, do not. 
The empirical study that follows supports the literature 
outside the insurance industry.
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Appropriating above normal profits from entering a new 
technology early is difficult. This is discussed in the 
economics literature. The firm most likely to appropriate 
abnormal profits in software is not the insurance firm, or 
software user, but the software developer. Firm 
characteristics as related to adoption of innovations are 
discussed in some of the economics literature. One 
characteristic that is frequently studied is firm size, 
which this study addresses. Characteristics that depend on 
local market conditions are not addressed in this study. 
Labor costs in relation to the aggressiveness of technology 
adoption would be an appropriate subject to examine, but 
outside the scope of this study.
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V . DATA
A. THE SURVEY
One hundred one questionnaires were mailed to firms of 
various sizes and specialties. A copy of the questionnaire 
is attached (Appendix I). Forty three of the surveys were 
returned, which, according to LOMA, is a very good response 
and comparable to other studies. The Harris-Katz study used 
a population of forty firms (Harris and Katz 1988, 125). As
discussed above, the Lubbe-Parker-Hoard study included nine 
South African firms. In a 1996 unpublished LOMA study 
entitled "Tracking Information Processing Expense," 
questionnaires were sent to approximately 450 member 
companies internationally and 57 were returned. (This 
information was obtained from Larry Underwood of LOMA). The 
responding firms represent a wide range of size, product 
mix, and geographic area indicating that the firms 
responding are a representative sample. For a size 
comparison, Table I contains weighted premiums and expense 
figures for the firms included in the study.
All of the firms surveyed were associated with LOMA and 
had a member on a Systems Committee. LOMA uses committees
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with members from several firms to develop and share general 
ideas. LOMA reviewed and approved the survey.
The first four main questions of the survey concerned 
the four softwares discussed in the introduction: personal
computer networks, relational data bases, expert systems, 
and workflow software. Five sub-questions were asked 
concerning each software. The first was whether the firm 
owns the software. The second was the year of purchase and 
the name of the product. The third was their ranking on a 
one to six scale of the maturity of the product at the time 
of purchase. The fourth asked if the firm had plans to 
purchase the software if it did not already own it. The 
fifth sub-question was a one to six ranking of the 
respondent's opinion of the current maturity of the 
software.
The purpose of the first four main questions was to 
compare the responding firms' aggressiveness in an objective 
manner. These questions allowed a ranking of the firms by 
the actual timing of their installation. The respondents' 
opinions on their aggressiveness was gathered in the fifth 
main question of the survey. It was a one to six self-
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ranking of the aggressiveness of the respondent's firm in 
purchasing software.
Question six asked for the number of employees working 
in the home office of the firm. The number of employees 
working at the firm's home office is a common industry 
method of comparing firm size. It was included on the 
survey because it is not available in Best's Insurance 
Reports. The purpose was an attempt to determine if there 
is a relationship between size and aggressiveness in 
technology. It was also an attempt to determine if 
conservative or aggressive firms make more efficient use of 
labor. The problem with this number is that several 
statutory firms may share the same employees, making its 
usefulness quite limited.
Question seven asked if the respondent would like a 
summary of the results of the survey. This was intended to 
provide a small incentive for taking the time to complete 
the survey. Question eight verified the full name of the 
firm to ensure a correct comparison to published financial 
data. Names of life insurance firms are very similar in 
some cases.
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The last question asked for specific examples of 
software purchases the respondent perceived as too early or 
too late. Confidentiality on specific responses and company 
information was promised to the respondents.
Six of the firms responding to the survey were 
eliminated because:
1. Firm A is a small midwestern firm that had not been 
rated by Best's and had no financial data available 
later than 1993.
2. Firm B ceded 90% of its life business to its new 
parent firm in 1990. In 1993 it assumed $1 billion of 
annuity reserves written by an affiliate. This caused 
a wide fluctuation in premiums which did not appear to 
have a relationship to the expenses.
3. Firms C and D ceded all premiums to a parent and 
showed zero premiums in Best's . Both firms have the 
same parent firm.
4. Firm E is a subsidiary of a large mutual. The firm 
was in the process of retiring and had no premiums or 
expenses by 1994.
5. Firm F is a subsidiary of a European firm and 
financial data were not published in Best's .
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All of the firms eliminated were for the lack of financial 
data, not for incomplete surveys.
Table II shows the number of the four softwares 
installed each year for the responding firms. It also 
includes planned installations from 1996 into the future.
The relational databases appear to be the most mature 
software by early installation. Next to networks, 
relational databases are also the most universally employed 
of the four softwares. This may be explained by the 
mainframe nature of insurance administration. Relational 
databases did not have a single peak year of installation 
but two in 1988 and 1993.
Networks appear to be the second to mature of the four 
softwares based on installation year. They were universally 
installed by the 43 responding firms. The peak year of 
installation was 1990 with eleven installations.
The survey indicated that expert systems and workflow 
softwares are more mature than anticipated. The expectation 
was for these softwares not to have reached Fichman's 
definition of critical mass. It appears that they have for 
the insurance industry. Expert systems have been installed 
gradually for the past decade. The persistence of these
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softwares could be because of one or more strong sponsors of 
expert systems. An example is the Lincoln National Risk 
Management Company which developed and markets the Life 
Underwriting System, an underwriting expert system. There 
is no one year that can be defined as a peak installation 
year for expert systems. Workflow systems seem to be 
peaking in 1995 and 1996. There is more competition in 
workflow software and it is not as proprietary to the 
insurance industry.
Planned software purchases were not included in the 
aggressiveness rankings since the purchases may never 
actually happen. One survey response that listed ownership 
of a relational database and one that listed ownership of a 
personal computer network did not indicate a year of 
purchase. The ranking for year of purchase of the first 
software was based on the other softwares listed. The 
ownership of the software was included for ranking by number 
of softwares owned.
The last question on the survey asked the managers to 
describe a software purchase that was too early or too late. 
This question proved to be unproductive. Perhaps the 
managers would rather not discuss their firm's development
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errors or perhaps open ended questions simply take too much 
time to complete.
B. FINANCIAL DATA
The Bender, Harris and Lubbe studies used an expense to 
premium ratio to measure profitability of the firms. In 
this paper, an expense-premium ratio was also used, but the 
premiums were weighted by line of business. The reason for 
the weighting is the vast difference in expenses from one 
type of insurance product to another. For example, annuity 
expenses are much lower than life insurance expenses. 
Therefore, a firm specializing in annuities should have much 
lower total expenses than a firm specializing in ordinary 
life. By weighting the premiums of firms of various sizes 
and products mixes, a better basis for comparison is formed.
The premiums were weighted by multiplying the various 
types of premiums by average expense allowances from the 
"1995 Survey of Life Insurance Company Comparative Expense 
Performance" from the Tillinghast Company (Tillinghast 1995, 
Appendix A ) . The Tillinghast Company annually surveys a 
group of life insurance firms concerning expenses. The 1995 
Tillinghast survey of 24 firms was the most recent at the
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time of this study. Expense allowances are an average 
expense based on the type of premium and derived from data 
submitted from the participating firms. The survey shows a 
history of five years of expenses by line of business. For 
example, first year ordinary life expenses in 1990 were 
138.55% of first year premium. In 1994 the expense 
allowance for the same line of business was 162.39% showing 
increasing expenses for Tillinghast's survey firms in first 
year ordinary life. The five year average for 1990 through 
1994 was 147.8. The five year average expense allowance for 
renewal ordinary life was 7% and was relatively flat for the 
five year period. The reason, of course, for high expenses 
the first year are underwriting expenses, commissions, and 
other sales expenses. Lines of business that have high 
first year expenses tend to be carefully underwritten while 
lines of business with low expenses like annuities have 
little underwriting or other front end administrative 
expenses.
The differences in expenses indicate that all premiums 
should not be treated the same. There is a better 
comparison of premiums among firms if they are weighted. 
Although the expenses by line of business change
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significantly over time, the 1990 through 1994 time period 
was the most recent comparison at the time the survey was 
done.
Table III shows expense allowances for each year and 
the average five year expense allowances for the various 
lines of business follows. This table illustrates the 
differences in expenses among the lines of business. Some 
adjustments and consolidations were made to the data set to 
make it conform to the financial information available. The 
adjustments are explained in the table.
Expenses were measured by using "general insurance 
expense" as published in Best's Insurance Reports for life 
and health insurance. General insurance expense includes 
operating expenses but excludes commissions, claims, taxes, 
and reserves. The purpose was to focus on home office 
administrative expense, which is, unlike sales expense, 
directly related to technology and labor. Financial 
information was gathered for the six years of 1989 through 
1994. Data from 1988 were not as complete as data from 1989 
forward but were used to determine the change in weighted 
premiums.
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The percentage of new business premiums from Best7 s was 
used to calculate the amount of new business and renewal 
premiums. The resulting two numbers were multiplied by the 
respective average expense allowances to weight the 
premiums. The reason is that expenses for new business are 
much higher than expenses for renewals and firms with a high 
percentage of new business would be expected to have higher 
general insurance expenses.
The same percentage was used to calculate the new 
business and renewals for accident and health insurance. 
Accident and health was the major product line for eight of 
the firms. These eight firms did not have a published 
percentage of new business for life. In these cases the 
increase in new accident and health insurance minus an 
industry average loss ratio of 9.2% was used (U . S . 
Marketplace 1995, 10) .
Table I shows general expenses, weighted premiums, and 
the expense to weighted premium ratio for the 37 firms 
remaining in the study. In Table I, the eight firms with 
major accident and health sales were 2, 3, 13, 17, 20, 21,
22, and 23.
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As with the above cited studies, a ratio of expenses to 
premiums, in this case weighted premiums, was used to 
measure the profitability of the firms. Technology has a 
definite and direct impact on expenses. Other measures of 
profitability can be thrown off by shocks that mask the 
technology factor. Examples would be large lawsuit 
settlements or expensive marketing campaigns. No attempt 
was made to compare the level of technology expense as some 
of the previous studies have done. Aggressiveness is the 
key component under consideration for this study.
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VI. THE MODEL
The firms were grouped into separate rankings by 
aggressiveness based on three criteria. The first was their 
self-ranking. One survey question asked the respondent to 
rank their firm in technological aggressiveness on a scale 
of one to six. The firms were divided into two groups, 
aggressive and conservative, based on the response to this 
question. It was not possible to rank the firms in three 
groups, as the other two rankings were, because most 
respondents ranked their firm a 3 or 4, the categories 
nearest the middle. The self-ranking variable did not have 
enough variation to be useful. This is more fully explained 
in the Section VII.
The second ranking was based on the number of the four 
softwares the firm owns. Firms ranked aggressive own all 
four softwares. Mid-ranked firms own three. Conservative 
firms own one or two. Future plans to purchase a software 
did not constitute owning a software for the purpose of this 
ranking.
The third ranking was based on the year the firm 
entered the first of the four softwares. The firms were 
divided into three groups. Firms ranked "aggressive"
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installed the first software from 1984 through 1986. Mid­
ranked firms installed the first software from 1987 through 
1989. Firms ranked "conservative" installed the first of 
the four softwares in 1990 or later.
Dummy variables were used to determine if there was a 
significant difference among the 3 7 firms remaining in the 
study in the three independent variables, aggressiveness by 
self-ranking, softwares owned, and year of entry into the 
first software. Regressions were run using the following 
independent variables:
1. Early entry, self ranking
2 . 1^*SR Late entry, self ranking
3 . Early entry, softwares owned
4 . DMSW Middle entry, softwares owned
5 . Late entry, softwares owned
6 . DEey Early entry, year of first entry
7 . DMjjy Middle entry, year of first entry
8 . DLgy Late entry, year of first entry
9 . d m e sw Early-middle combined, softwares owned
10 . DMLSW Late-Middle combined, softwares owned
11. DME^ Early-middle combined, year of first entry
12 . DMLey Late-middle combined, year of first entry
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Several combinations of the above independent variables 
were examined. The following equations were used to 
determine if any of the three groups, early technology 
investors (aggressive), middle, or late (conservative) had 
any advantage in the expense to weighted premium ratio. It 
was expected on the basis of previous insurance industry 
studies that the more aggressive technology investors would 
have a more favorable ratio of expenses as compared to 
premium income.
1 . E/WP = Ct0+ P. DMSW) + p2(DEsw)
2 . E/WP = a0+ P. DMey) + P2(DEey)
3 . E/WP = a0+ P. DMSW) + P2(DLSW)
4 . E/WP = a0+ P, DMey) + P2(DLEY)
5 . E/WP = a0+ P.J)MESW) + 8
6 . E/WP = a0+ P,kDMEEY) + s
7 . E/WP = a0+ P,[DMLSW) + 8
8 . E/WP = oc0+ P,kDMLEY) + 8
9 . E/WP = a0+ P.,DEsr) + 8
Equations 1-4 were intended to measure the three groups 
of firms, early, middle, and late entrants individually 
based on the criteria of year of entry and softwares owned.
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Equations 5-8 were intended to combine and measure two of 
the three groups against the third on the same criteria, 
year of entry and softwares owned. Equation 9 was intended 
to measure two groups of firms based on self-ranking.
The above equations were also examined with variations 
in the dependent variable. The other left hand side 
variables were:
1. AE/WP Year to year change in E/WP
2. 5AE/WP Five year average change in E/WP
3. WP/EMP Average weighted premiums per
employee
4. WP94/EMP 1994 weighted premiums per employee 
The results of dependent variables AE/WP and 5AE/WP
were expected to support, or be somewhat similar to, the 
E/WP variable with one group of firms having a more 
favorable change in expenses. The dependent variables 
WP/EMP and WP94/EMP were expected to show a more favorable 
(higher) weighted premium per employee in one group.
The single year of 1994 employees to weighted premium 
ratio was attempted because only current employment count 
was known. Although premium information was available back
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to 1989, employee count was not. It was an attempt to use a 
ratio of the most current available employee and premium 
information.
Because firm size is such an important firm
characteristic in the literature, a test was done to
determine if firm size has an impact on the effectiveness of 
technology investment. Size was determined by weighted 
premiums instead of the alternative of assets. Assets are a 
weak measurement of firm size in the life insurance industry 
because firms selling asset intensive products, such as 
annuities, may incorrectly show very low expenses.
The age of the firms was not considered a factor in the 
effective use of technology because life insurance firms are 
regulated to survive. Even the young companies are very old 
in comparison to other industries and the difference between 
80 year old firms and 100 year old firms has little
relevance to this study. Table IV shows all variables used
and their definitions.
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VII. RESULTS
The results did support the hypothesis that technology 
investors who time their software installations correctly 
would have a lower expense to weighted premium ratio. It 
was not the aggressive technology investors, however, with 
the more favorable expense ratio. The late technology 
entrants showed a lower expense to weighted premium ratio 
than the combined early and middle groups, whether grouped 
by year of entry or the number of softwares owned.
A significant difference was found when the middle and 
aggressive groups were combined and compared to the 
conservative group and the expense to weighted premium ratio 
was used for the dependent variable. The difference was 
significant when the firms were grouped both by the year of 
entry into the first software or by the number of softwares 
owned. Also attempted was the year as an independent 
variable with the expense to weighted premium ratio as the 
dependent variable. This test was done to determine if late 
entries had increasing or decreasing expenses.
1. In regression 3, Table V, the firms were grouped 
by the number of the four softwares owned. The test 
indicated a significant difference between groups when the
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early (aggressive) and middle adopters were combined and the 
expense to premium ratio was the dependent variable. 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table V I .
E/WP = a0 + P^DMEsw) + s 
Again, firms owning all four softwares were considered 
aggressive adopters, firms owning three were considered mid­
ranked, and firms owning one or two were considered 
conservative. The dummy variable DMESW was used in this 
equation which is a combination of middle and aggressive 
firms based on the number of softwares used. There were 13 
firms and 78 observations in the conservative group and 24 
firms and 144 observations in the middle and aggressive 
groups combined. The t statistic was 2.712 which is 
significant at a 5% level. The F value of 7.357 is greater 
than the critical F (1i22o) value of 3.84 at the 5% level of 
significance. The expense to weighted premium ratio was 
.8095 in the conservative group and .9751 in the middle and 
aggressive groups or 2 0.5% higher.
2. The year of adoption of the first software was 
tested in two ways. In the first, regression 4, Table V, 
the firms were divided into groups using dummy variables by
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year of adoption. Again, the test indicated a significant 
difference between groups when the early and middle adopters 
were combined and the expense to weighted premium ratio was 
on the left hand side:
E/WP = a0 + p!(DMEEY) + 8 
E/WP is the expense to weighted premium ratio and DMEey is a 
dummy variable combination of middle and early (aggressive) 
technology investors based on year of entry into the first 
software. There were 7 firms and 42 observations in the 
conservative group and 3 0 firms and 18 0 observations in the 
middle and aggressive groups combined. The t statistic was 
2.277 which is significant at a 5% level. The F value of 
5.185 is greater than the critical F (1/22o) value of 3.84 at 
the 5% level of significance. The expense to weighted 
premium ratio was .7788 in the conservative group and .9491 
in the middle and aggressive groups or 21.9% higher. Four 
of the firms were in the conservative group in both 
regressions.
3. The second test of the year of entry into the 
first software used the year of adoption of the first 
software, ranging from 1984 through 1994, as an independent
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variable. The results are shown in Table VII. The expense 
to weighted premium ratio was the dependent variable:
E/WP = a„ + Pi(YR) + s 
This model produced a coefficient of -.0307, indicating a 
declining expense ratio as firms entered the new technology 
later. This test supports the previous two models where the 
firms were divided into three groups by aggressiveness. The 
t statistic was -2.549 and F was 6.497 indicating 
significance at the 5% level. Again, R2 was low at 2.87%. 
Also attempted was the change in the expense to weighted 
premium ratio on the left hand side with no significant 
results.
4. Although somewhat scattered, there are other 
results on Table V marked by an asterisk, where the expense 
to weighted premium ratio is the dependent variable and 
there were significant results. Whether the groups are 
combined or examined separately, the pattern is the same. 
This pattern holds when the firms are divided by softwares 
owned or by the year of first adoption. When examined 
individually, aggressive and mid-ranked firms show positive 
coefficients indicating that expenses are relatively higher
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in those firms. When groups are combined, the mid-ranked 
and aggressive firms show a positive coefficient. The mid­
ranked and conservative firms show a negative coefficient.
5. A test was done to determine how firm size 
interacts with aggressiveness in technology. The results 
are shown in Table VIII, frequency distributions by size and 
aggressiveness are shown in Table IX, and descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table X.
In this test the firms were divided into small, medium, 
and large categories, again using dummy variables. With 37 
total firms, 12 were categorized as small, 13 medium, and 12 
large. The ranking was based on 1994 weighted premiums, the 
most recent information available. Therefore, the size 
ranking was based on a current number, not the five year 
average weighted premium. As stated earlier, the ranking 
was not based on assets because it is a poor measurement of 
size when evaluating firms with much different product 
mixes. The ranking was not based on the number of home 
office employees because several statutory firms may use the 
same employees.
The size dummies were multiplied by the aggressiveness 
dummies in year of entry and number of softwares owned
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classifications. Again, the aggressive firms and medium 
aggressive firms were combined. The following equations 
were used:
E/WP=a0+pi(DMEsw)+p2(DSWL)+p3(DSWM)+e 
E / WP=a0+P i (DMEey)+P2(D YRL)+P3(D YRM)+e 
The variables DMESW and DMEey were the same as 
previously defined. The other variable were:
DSWL Large size dummy x medium/aggressive dummy
(DMESW) ranked by softwares owned 
DSWM Medium size dummy x medium/aggressive dummy
(DMESW) ranked by softwares owned 
DYRL Large size dummy x medium/aggressive dummy
(DMEey) ranked by year of first entry 
DYRM Medium size dummy x medium/aggressive dummy
(DMEey) ranked by year of first entry 
The previous tests show that conservative technology 
investors have significantly more favorable expense to 
weighted premium ratios than aggressive technology 
investors. The results shown in Table VIII indicate that 
with the interactive size variables added, the affect of the 
aggressiveness variable remains. This result holds for both
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measurements of aggressiveness, the softwares owned and the 
year of first entry. This outcome shows no interaction 
between firm size and aggressiveness but strengthens the 
results from the previous regressions. The means of the 
expense to weighted premium ratio are shown on Table IX. In 
the equation where aggressiveness was measured by softwares 
owned, large firms appeared to have significantly more 
favorable expenses.
Summarizing the above five results, aggressive 
investors in technology show a less favorable expense to 
weighted premium ratio while conservative investors show a 
more favorable ratio. This holds when the firms are ranked 
by the number of softwares owned or the year of adoption of 
the first software. In all regressions, R2 was low showing a 
low predictive ability. This was expected because only 
dummy variables were used as independent variables.
Several relationships were examined for which there was 
no significant difference between the groups examined.
Tables IX through XIV contain the following regressions with 
descriptive statistics in Tables XV through XVIII.
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1. The firms were compared by their self-ranking into 
conservative or aggressive categories in the following 
relationships (regression 9, Tables XI through XIV):
E/WP = a0 + P,(DEsr) + 8 
AE/WP = a0 + Pi(DEsr) + s 
5 AE/WP = a0 + P,(DEsr) + s 
WP/EMP = a0 + P,(DEsr) + s 
WP94/EMP = a0+ P,(DESH) + 8 
There was no significant result using the self-ranking as an 
independent variable. Perhaps indicating a lack of good 
information to the managers surveyed concerning their firm's 
relative aggressiveness. As stated earlier, most 
respondents (3 0 of the 4 3 managers responding) ranked their 
firm one notch either side of the middle, not committing to 
a very aggressive or very conservative response. Perhaps 
this is because most information services professionals do 
not like to think of their firm as a follower. Only one of 
the firms ranked aggressive in the self-ranking was ranked 
aggressive in the two objective criteria. Only two firms 
ranked conservative in the self-ranking were also ranked 
conservative in the two objective criteria. Because of this
lack of consistency and lack of significance in the tests, 
no further tests on self-ranking were attempted.
2. The year to year change in the expense to weighted
premium ratio was used as the dependent variable in the
following relationships (Table XI):
AE/WP = a0 + p^DME^) + 8
AE/WP = a0 + P^DMEg*) + 8
AE/WP = a0+ P,(DMSW) + p2(DEsw) + 8
AE/WP = a0+ P,(DMct) + + e
AE/WP = a0 + P^DMLey) + 8
AE/WP = a0+ P^DMLgw) + 8
AE/WP = a0+ P^DMsJ + P2(DLSW) + 8
AE/WP = a0+ P^DMey) + P2(DLEY) + 8
There seemed to be a large fluctuation from year to year in 
the weighted premiums in several firms. It was rare for a 
firm to have several years of steadily growing weighted 
premiums without some negative or low growth numbers. Other 
factors could be involved in this fluctuation for which
there were no data available. Examples might be a change in
marketing plan, distribution system, commission system, 
product mix, or purchase or sale of a block of business.
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3. The five year average change in the expense to 
weighted premium ratio was used as the dependent variable in 
the following relationships (Table XII):
5 AE/WP = a0+ p!(DMEEY) + s
5 AE/WP = a0 + P^DMEgw) + s
5 AE/WP = a0+ P!(DMsw) + P2(DESW) + s
5 AE/WP = a0+ P^DMgy) + P2(DEey) + s
5 AE/WP = a0 + P^DML^) + s
5 AE/WP = a0 + P^ DMLg,,) + s
5 AE/WP = a0+ P!(DMsw) + P2(DLsw) + s
5 AE/WP = a0 + PiCDMey) + P2(DLEY) + 8
The average was calculated for a five year period using data 
from 1989 through 1994. This variable reduced the number of 
observations in the regression to 37. No significant 
difference was found in the five year average expense to 
weighted premium ratio among the various groups. Table VI 
shows the t and F statistics, R2, and coefficients for the 
above equations.
4. The middle and conservative firms were grouped for 
a comparison to the aggressive group by the year of entry 
and the number of softwares owned (Tables V and XI):
E/WP = a0 + P,(DMLey) + £
E/WP = a0+ P^DMLgw) + £
E/WP = a0 + Pi(DMsw) + P2(DLSW) + £
E/WP = a0+ P^DMey) + P2(DLEY) + £
AE/WP = a0 + P^DML^) + £
AE/WP = a0 + P^DMLg*) + £
AE/WP = a0 + P,(DMSW) + p2(DLsw) + £
AE/WP = a0+ Pi(DMey) + P2(DLEY) + £
The weighted premium to general expense ratio (E/WP) was not 
significantly different based on softwares owned or the year 
of entry. Likewise, there was no significant difference 
between the two groups with the average expense to weighted 
premium on the left hand side.
5. All respondents provided information on the 
current (October 1995) number of employees at the firm's 
home office. A ratio of weighted premiums per employee was 
explored to determine if there was a significant difference 
between the aggressive, middle, and conservative firms. The 
expectation was for a more favorable ratio of weighted 
premiums per employee in a single group or a combination of 
groups. For example, a group of firms with a lower ratio of
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expenses to weighted premiums may have a higher ratio of 
premiums per employee. This expectation could be based on 
the fact that labor is a large part of general insurance 
expense. A significant test would indicate that correct 
technology timing could lead to a more effective use of 
labor.
Two dependent variable ratios were examined. The first 
was a six year average weighted premium divided by the 
number of employees (WP/EMP), as shown in Table XIII. The 
second was the weighted premiums in the last year, 1994, 
divided by the number of employees (WP94/EMP), as shown in 
Table XIV. The second average was based on current employee 
count and the most current expense information. It was done 
to reduce the effect of unknown employee count fluctuation 
over the period examined. Regressions were run with the 
dummy variables to determine any significant difference 
among the single three groups of firms or combined groups. 
The regressions were run for the individual aggressive, 
middle, and conservative software purchasers as well as for 
the combined groups middle/aggressive and middle/ 
conservative groups. None of these regressions showed any 
significant difference among the groups examined.
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A possible explanation for the lack of significance 
could be the differences in structure in different firms. 
Where the financial numbers might involve the life insurance 
subsidiary of a large health insurer, the survey could 
indicate the number of employees in the entire group of 
firms rather than the life insurance subsidiary only.
6. A test was done to determine if, as earlier years 
were dropped out of the population, the significance 
remained (Table XIX). If the significance did remain, it 
would present a more robust relationship between 
conservative investment in technology and lower expenses. 
This test was done for the two equations that showed a 
significant difference between the conservative and the 
combined middle and aggressive groups as follows:
E/WP = cc0 + (3,(DMEey) + 8 
E/WP = a0 + P,(DMESW) + s
When each year was dropped out, starting with 1989 and 
continuing until the single year of 1994 remained, the t 
statistics decreased for the comparisons by year of entry 
and number of softwares owned.
The decrease in the t statistics must be partly a 
result of the decreasing number of observations from 222 in
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the original data, dropping 3 7 observations per year, until 
3 7 remained in the last regression. It could also be 
because of the fluctuations in expenses and premiums that 
happened frequently with many of the responding firms.
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VIII. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The hypothesis was that one of the groups would have a 
more favorable expense to weighted premium ratio. This 
hypothesis can be accepted. Other life insurance industry 
studies indicate that aggressive technology investors have 
the more favorable expense ratios or profitability.
However, some economics literature and general literature 
conflict with this assumption. The significant results of 
this study indicated that conservative firms had a more 
favorable weighted premium ratio. These results are also 
consistent with previous literature outside the life 
insurance industry.
It must be kept in mind that with this study, the 
aggressiveness of new software installation was the focus. 
Most other studies have used the level of expenditures on 
information technology. It should also be kept in mind that 
this study concentrated on software as a measurement of 
aggressiveness. It does not take into account the 
aggressiveness of the firm on hardware or talent or the 
amount invested in these categories. Another major 
difference between this study and previous industry studies
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is that premiums in this study were weighted by line of 
business and the expected expenses for those lines.
Software and software maintenance are growing portions 
of information technology expenditures and, according to 
Fichman and Kemerer, the weakest link in a firm's technology 
package (Fichman and Kemerer 1993, 7). As firms shift from 
homegrown software to packaged software, huge risks are 
involved if the software is not dominant at the time of 
purchase. This does not mean that one or two software 
investment errors would necessarily damage a life insurance 
firm's profitability. Many other factors are involved.
There are several reasons why slower investment in 
software could be related to a more favorable expense ratio. 
The reasons are explored below. Some of these ideas 
overlap. They are organized according to the literature in 
which they were developed.
1. Nathan Rosenberg discusses the impact of 
expectations on the rate of diffusion and innovation. He 
cites one of Joseph Schumpeter's assumptions, that the first 
firm to innovate will reap above normal profits (Rosenberg 
1976, 525; Schumpeter 1936, 1-94, 128-156). But, the pace 
of technological change may create a greater risk for the
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firm by causing its expensive new technology to become 
obsolete too soon. Added to this risk are others. The 
disruptive costs may be high, a very real risk with new 
software. The number of defects in the new technology may 
be high. It may take time to customize the technology to 
specific purposes. Rosenberg argues that the relationship 
between the rate of technological change and the rate of 
innovation and diffusion may be different than expected 
intuitively (Rosenberg 1976, 523). It may follow that if 
firms believe they would be more profitable by waiting, 
perhaps they actually are.
2. The reason most discussed in the literature 
regarding why aggressive firms could be less profitable is 
that technology creates only temporary competitive 
advantages. Nearly all microeconomics texts discuss this. 
Lila J. Truett and Dale B. Truett discuss competitive firms 
returning to normal profit as innovations spread through an 
industry in their text Managerial Economics (Truett and 
Truett 1992, 295-304). Any higher than normal profits are 
only temporary and signal more firms to enter an industry. 
James H. Henderson and Richard E. Quandt include a similar 
discussion in their previously cited text (Henderson and
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Quandt 1986, 21). It follows that this argument applies to 
firms entering a new technology as well. The previously 
cited economics literature on appropriability is consistent 
with this idea.
Although life insurance firms have a history of 
sharing their ideas, it is a competitive industry. Fichman 
and Kemerer write that there is no "sustainable competitive 
advantage" to early entry into software (Fichman and Kemerer 
1993, 21). Dominant technology is simply a necessity but 
there is no advantage in paying the extra price for early 
entry or taking the risk of being "stranded" with a non­
dominant technology (Fichman and Kemerer 1993, 11). Loren
Hitt and Erik Brynjolfsson argue that industries with few 
barriers to information technology adoption, which applies 
to the life insurance industry, are not likely to find 
lasting competitive advantage by spending more on the 
technology (Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1994, 4) . Information 
technology reduces the coordination costs of locating 
appropriate services. The increased efficiency intensifies 
competition by eliminating barriers that formerly helped 
firms maintain a degree of monopoly. In the meantime, the 
firms squeeze out other labor and capital inputs. The
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information technology investments will increase 
productivity but reduce profits.
An example from another industry is the automatic 
teller machine (ATM). When first introduced, ATMs were a 
possible competitive advantage despite a high price for 
early entry into the technology. There was a risk of 
stranding since there was no guarantee that the public would 
accept the ATMs as a replacement for a teller. Barriers to 
adopting the technology were eventually eliminated. Costs 
of other inputs, especially labor, were reduced. Now, ATMs 
are necessary for bank profitability. It would be a 
competitive disadvantage for banks not to have ATMs 
available to their customers.
A more universal example is personal computer networks. 
The purpose of a personal computer network is for users to 
share resources in the form of hardware, software, and 
files. The survey results show that networks became 
dominant in the sample group about 1989. Only one firm 
purchased a network in 1984. In 1984, without complementary 
software available for networks, it might have been less 
expensive and more effective to run individual personal 
computers than struggle with a primitive network.
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3. The strategy for technology investment can involve 
a competitive advantage, but a very common reason for new 
technology is for the reduction of labor costs.
Conventional wisdom, at least among information managers in 
insurance firms, indicates that a firm that invests too 
little in information technology can have labor costs that 
are too high. However, entry into technology too early can 
create the need for talent in a specific technology that is 
too expensive. Even a partial offset of reduced operating 
labor cost by increased technology staff cost may be one 
contributing factor to the fact the aggressive firms do not 
show a lower expense ratio in this study.
An example is contract programming, the hiring of 
specially talented technicians to install new software.
When a software is new, talent in installing and developing 
the software is rare and expensive. A few years after the 
software has reached its critical mass, the expert in that 
software might be less expensive, or at least easier to 
find, and possibly not needed at all.
Software, especially mainframe software, can take 
months and even years to install, learn, and convert old 
applications. This is true whether the old applications
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were homegrown or purchased from a specialized software 
vendor. In many cases, this complexity makes expensive 
outside talent a necessity. In the life insurance industry, 
insurance administrative software, the engine that maintains 
the policy records, is an example. Installing the software 
to maintain new policies is complex and converting old 
policies is even more complex. Outside help is usually 
necessary for training, systems design, and coding 
modifications.
Why install the new software? Eventually, the old 
system will not handle new products and services. Operating
I
expenses may begin creeping up as increasingly complex 
transactions begin requiring more labor to perform. The 
question then becomes when, not if, to invest in the 
software.
4. Investments in technology are first an expense 
before their benefits begin to show in the financial 
reports. Profitability may decline, then increase. 
Aggressive firms with a high expense-premium ratio may not 
continue that ratio. Erik Brynjolfsson writes that the 
greatest impact of information technology occurs after two 
years (Brynjolfsson et. al. 1989, 25). It is possible that
70
aggressive firms remain aggressive over the long run and 
continue to invest in software early. Thus, as a previously 
installed software begins to pay off, the next one is 
causing higher expenses. Information technology can also 
cause hidden costs, possibly organizational, that that are 
not considered a direct part of the technology but will 
appear elsewhere.
5. Vijay Gurbaxani and Seungjin Whang describe a late 
mover advantage (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991, 66) . If early 
technology investment costs more, then it follows that late 
investment costs less. Later investing firms get a more 
mature technology that is installed less painfully and 
disruptively. The advantage shows up in less expensive 
hardware, less expensive and more fully developed software, 
and less expensive and more abundant talent.
Examples of the high cost of early hardware purchases 
abound. The early video cassette recorder provides one 
example. With software, the costs are less obvious. It is 
common for early software versions to be offered by the 
vendor at a special price or free as a beta test version. A 
problem is that the software may not be developed fully 
enough to be useful as a productive tool. Or, it could be
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so defect ridden that it is dangerous to the firm's 
information structure, even extending outside the scope of 
the new software. This type of experimentation is fun for 
the tester and possibly even helpful to his or her career.
It is clearly not always helpful to the information manager 
or the firm and may be detrimental.
6 . A study by David Blanchflower and Simon Burgess 
examined the effect of technology on manufacturing firms in 
the United Kingdom and Australia (Blanchflower 1995, 
passim). The results showed that although technology was 
employed to reduce cost, it resulted in higher job growth. 
Efficiencies created by technology enable more output, a 
larger market share and eventually higher employment by the 
firm. As Zvi Griliches argued, appropriating above normal 
profits by the firm is difficult and may never happen 
(Griliches 1958, 430). And, as Hitt and Brynjolfsson argue, 
consumers will keep the difference (Hitt and Brynjolfsson 
1994, 5). Efficiencies can reduce the price of a product
and result in increasing demand. The industry grows and 
employment increases.
A question is whether a study on manufacturing is 
applicable to a service industry like life insurance in the
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United States. It is possible. Products with increasing 
popularity, like variable universal life, are becoming more 
complex. Firms offering these complex products need an 
administrative system that will facilitate their 
development. Firms that enter various new markets early may 
quickly increase market share. Growth in employment 
follows, causing a jump in expenses. The new staff could be 
in technical or operating personnel and it could be 
permanent employees or contract employees. In the long run 
the expensive administrative software is a good investment.
The survey conducted in this study did not address the 
life products offered by each firm other than the broad 
categories used in the premium weighting. It would be 
interesting in a future study to compare technological 
advancement with the complexity of products offered.
7. Fichman and Kemerer write that most studies on 
information technology have focused on hardware (Fichman and 
Kemerer 1993, 7). Studies concerning software are fewer and 
less reliable. It is possible that a study of hardware 
would show different results than a study of software. 
Hardware could be more mature than software when it reaches 
the market making an early investment in hardware a viable
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strategy. Immature software may be introduced into the 
market before it is fully developed with the developer 
hoping that a critical mass will occur.
An example of different public expectations between new 
hardware performance and new software performance may be the 
public outcry that occurred when Intel released the flawed 
Pentium chip. On the other hand, the bugs in Windows 95 
were considered normal. Purchasers of software seem to be 
more tolerant of defects than hardware purchasers.
8. There is some question about who is the actual 
innovator. In Griliches7 hybrid corn example there were no 
above normal profits (Griliches 1958, 430) . If there were, 
however, it would be the seed corn firm, not the farmer 
receiving them because there are no barriers to planting the 
hybrid. This argument, if extended to manufacturing would 
apply to producers of capital goods and users of those 
capital goods.
As discussed in the economics literature section, 
software developers have much in common with producers of 
capital goods. Although it might not be considered as such 
in tax laws, software itself could be considered a capital 
good in its economic behavior. It is evaluated and
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purchased like a capital good, has a specific purpose in 
production or service, has a finite life, and constant 
improvements to new versions. Consistent with Keith 
Pavitt's definition of a capital goods producer with high 
appropriability, it would be the software developer 
appropriating any of the returns from their research and 
development (Pavitt 1984, 382). Also, as with capital 
goods, it would be to the purchaser's advantage to wait, as 
Rosenberg argued, until the rate of technical change 
diminished {Rosenberg 1976, 527-528). This is consistent 
with Kenneth Arrow's "Learning by Doing" theory. Learning 
takes place in the capital goods industry, not in the use of 
capital goods once built, or in this case, software (Arrow 
1962, 157). Realistically, a software user does make some
enhancements but it may still be an advantage to software 
users to wait until a new software has had a chance to 
mature and the rate of required improvements diminishes.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Fichman and Kemerer state several criteria that make an 
investment in software profitable. Among these are higher 
profitability when there is a larger network of users thus 
avoiding "transient incompatibility costs" (Fichman and 
Kemerer 1993, 10). Another is that profitability is 
enhanced when there is a greater number of compatible 
products. Offsetting the above profit factors, there is the 
high cost of stranding if a software does not reach 
dominance. All of these factors can contribute to the idea 
that early investment in software is risky and not 
necessarily a profitable competitive strategy.
This study uses the aggressiveness of software 
installations in the life insurance industry, measured in 
two ways, year of entry and number of softwares owned, as an 
indicator of aggressiveness in technology in general. No 
causal relationship was found between the timing of software 
purchases and profitability as measured by an expenses to 
weighted premium ratio. This study shows a significant 
difference in expense to weighted premium ratios between the 
conservative one third of users of new software and the more 
aggressive two thirds. It is the conservative software
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investors who show the more favorable expense to weighted 
premium ratio.
Even the conservative firms in the survey conducted, 
however, were more aggressive in software installations than 
expected. All of the 43 firms responding to the survey had 
installed personal computer networks. Nearly all had 
installed or have planned installations of relational 
database software. Even the two less dominant softwares, 
expert systems and workflow systems, had been installed by 
more than half the respondents.
Technology is only one factor affecting profit and 
expenses. The low R2was expected for this reason. Perhaps 
the favorable expense ratio of the more conservative 
technology investors is caused by their conservative 
approach to hiring, bond and securities investing, and 
marketing. Early investment in software technology, 
however, does not appear to make a life insurance firm 
profitable.
APPENDIX I
THE SURVEY 
(Originally one page, two sides)
University of TECHNOLOGY SURVEY FOR LIFE
Nebraska at INSURANCE COMPANIES
Omaha
Does your company use a relational database?
Q Y es Q N o
If yes, what year did your company purchase the software? Y ear________. Name of product?
On a scale o f one to six, how mature did you consider relational database technology at the time of 
purchase?
Experimental Mature
□  1 Q 2  D3 □ 4  0 5  Q6
If  no, does your company have plans to purchase a relational data base software?
Q Y es Y ear?________ . Q N o
On a scale o f one to six, how mature do you consider relational database technology now? 
Experimental Mature
Q 1  Q 2  Q 3  Q4  Q 5  Q 6
Has your company installed personal com puter networks?
□ Y es  Q N o
If yes, what year did your company purchase the first network? Y ear_______ . Name of product?
On a scale of one to six, how mature did you consider PC networks at the time of purchase? 
Experimental Mature
□  1 U 2 D 3 D 4 D 5 D 6
If no, does your company have plans to install a network?
Q Y es Y ear?________ . Q N o
On a scale o f one to six, how mature do you consider PC network technology now?
Experimental Mature
□  1 0 2  Q 3  Q 4  Q 5  Q 6
Has your company purchased an expert system for underwriting, claims, or another function? 
□ Y es  Q N o
If yes, what year did your company purchase the expert system? Y ear______ . Name of product?
On a scale of one to six, how mature did you consider expert technology at the time of purchase?
Experimental Mature
□  1 Q 2  Q 3  Q 4  Q 5  Q 6
If no, does your company have plans to purchase an expert system? 
□ Y e s  Y ear?________ . Q N o
e. On a scale o f one to six, how mature do you consider expert technology now?
Experimental Mature
□  1 Q 2  Q 3  Q 4  Q 5  Q 6
4. a. Has your company purchased a work flow software (usually with image technology)?
Q Y es Q N o
b. If yes, what year did your company purchase its first work flow software? Y ear________ . Name of
product?_______________________________________________________________________________.
c. On a scale of one to six, how mature did you consider work flow technology at the time o f purchase?
Experimental Mature
□ i a 2 cp  d 4 c p  c p
d. If no, does your company have plans to purchase a work flow system?
Q Y es______ Year?________ . Q N o
e. On a scale of one to six, how mature do you consider work flow technology now?
Experimental Mature
□  1 Q 2  Q 3  Q 4  Q 5  Q 6
5. On a scale o f one to six, how aggressive do you consider your company when entering new technology?
Conservative Aggressive
□  1 02 D3 Q4 05 \J6
6. How many employees work in your home office?__________
7. Check here if you would like a summary of the results of this study? □
8. The company for which you answered this survey is «COM PANY». If your answers concern a different 
company or subsidiary, please give the formal name of that company.
9. You can probably think of examples of occasions when a technology was purchased too early or perhaps too 
late (at your company or another). Your experience may help reveal when technology investment is most 
effective. If you would like to share an example, please write it below or to flogan(2),woodmen.com or call 
Frank Logan at 402-271-7204. O f course, all com m ents will be kept confidential.
APPENDIX II
TABLES
1TABLE I
FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY FIRM 
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Firm 1 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 32,972 35,447 36,787 40,137 38,616 43,479
Wt Prem 22,182 24,623 29,322 30,460 31,860 35,166
Exp Ratio 1.4864 1.4396 1.2546 1.3177 1.2121 1.2364
Firm 2 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 123,673 92,539 85,898 71,033 127,685 114,227
Wt Prem 92,123 37,379 46,714 37,026 296,948 130,107
Exp Ratio 1.3425 2.4757 1.8388 1.9185 0.4300 0.8779
Firm 3 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 30,929 32,879 36,198 38,125 36,916 37,123
Wt Prem 31,181 34,990 35,851 34,818 37,277 34,252
Exp Ratio 0.9919 0.9397 1.0097 1.0950 0.9903 1.0838
Firm 4 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 27,443 30,554 27,053 29,966 31,814 27,207
Wt Prem 26,359 37,519 30,848 27,086 25,213 38,820
Exp Ratio 1.0411 0.8144 0.8770 1.1063 1.2618 0.7009
Firm 5 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 36,140 44,784 59,061 68,710 71,062 86,735
Wt Prem 107,338 142,825 177,690 190,344 189,138 217,213
Exp Ratio 0.3367 0.3136 0.3324 0.3610 0.3757 0.3993
Firm 6 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 156,066 168,771 168,423 191,395 199,043 206,179
Wt Prem 223,230 214,765 186,652 239,384 232,923 188,966
Exp Ratio 0.6991 0.7858 0.9023 0.7995 0.8545 1.0911
Firm 7 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 7,572 8,307 8,899 5,523 7,713 8,362
Wt Prem 7,726 7,901 9,641 7,638 7,506 8,681
Exp Ratio 0.9800 1.0514 0.9230 0.7230 1.0276 0.9633
Firm 8 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 25,367 28,374 33,399 40,074 45,072 57,450
Wt Prem 26,250 30,217 40,464 48,232 38,372 36,915
Exp Ratio 0.9664 0.9390 0.8254 0.8309 1.1746 1.5563
2Firm 9 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 42,910 45,286 80,939 169,443 155,708 167,810
Wt Prem 25,969 31,932 56,927 129,488 147,794 181,709
Exp Ratio 1.6523 1.4182 1.4218 1.3086 1.0535 0.9235
Firm 10 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 14,233 15,906 16,454 16,046 18,092 17,425
Wt Prem 24,168 25,878 25,224 22,329 24,519 22,496
Exp Ratio 0.5889 0.6147 0.6523 0.7186 0.7379 0.7746
Firm 11 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 50,872 59,467 53,780 48,237 47,579 53,366
Wt Prem 117,428 140,747 112,433 106,709 121,265 148,507
Exp Ratio 0.4332 0.4225 0.4783 0.4520 0.3924 0.3593
Firm 12 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 38,503 41,795 45,799 50,328 55,476 55,912
Wt Prem 48,058 48,056 57,066 73,882 78,148 72,041
Exp Ratio 0.8012 0.8697 0.8026 0.6812 0.7099 0.7761
Firm 13 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 11,175 11,239 11,490 12,587 14,646 14,171
Wt Prem 27,028 30,735 23,828 24,469 22,777 18,080
Exp Ratio 0.4135 0.3657 0.4822 0.5144 0.6430 0.7838
Firm 14 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 94,198 100,079 96,905 92,481 83,004 95,472
Wt Prem 185,146 161,096 198,593 188,390 204,010 228,937
Exp Ratio 0.5088 0.6212 0.4880 0.4909 0.4069 0.4170
Firm 15 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 23,634 26,813 29,083 24,721 35,795 44,206
Wt Prem 33,402 39,320 45,765 35,378 60,997 61,460
Exp Ratio 0.7076 0.6819 0.6355 0.6988 0.5868 0.7193
Firm 16 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 404,906 448,860 516,117 544,566 614,546 745,547
Wt Prem 410,081 479,340 516,453 542,971 1,106,992 641,812
Exp Ratio 0.9874 0.9364 0.9993 1.0029 0.5551 1.1616
3Firm 17 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 55,247 61,049 69,207 73,583 75,595 77,535
Wt Prem 173,592 140,316 160,957 149,157 144,901 158,434
Exp Ratio 0.3183 0.4351 0.4300 0.4933 0.5217 0.4894
Firm 18 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 29,237 34,318 31,305 29,129 35,392 21,956
Wt Prem 70,374 66,203 47,066 25,029 21,091 24,431
Exp Ratio 0.4155 0.5184 0.6651 1.1638 1.6780 0.8987
Firm 19 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 29,037 35,746 29,895 27,740 31,963 29,544
Wt Prem 16,652 18,231 19,653 19,201 19,102 16,476
Exp Ratio 1.7437 1.9607 1.5211 1.4447 1.6732 1.7932
Firm 20 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 505,413 502,022 418,861 443,437 390,333 370,477
Wt Prem 395,161 374,977 349,214 375,151 288,212 282,845
Exp Ratio 1.2790 1.3388 1.1994 1.1820 1.3543 1.3098
Firm 21 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 87,882 102,073 101,233 104,058 118,258 163,231
Wt Prem 111,765 172,699 145,152 163,688 170,343 199,830
Exp Ratio 0.7863 0.5910 0.6974 0.6357 0.6942 0.8168
Firm 22 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 48,482 59,096 72,732 77,952 85,005 87,229
Wt Prem 32,817 41,248 48,089 53,034 83,932 58,015
Exp Ratio 1.4773 1.4327 1.5125 1.4699 1.0128 1.5036
Firm 23 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 173,420 200,681 323,096 347,594 369,285 373,328
Wt Prem 111,271 140,352 254,685 213,249 277,166 300,745
Exp Ratio 1.5585 1.4298 1.2686 1.6300 1.3324 1.2413
Firm 24 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 126,646 144,253 151,158 158,729 158,730 165,981
Wt Prem 134,749 128,431 138,409 167,349 153,248 173,265
Exp Ratio 0.9399 1.1232 1.0921 0.9485 1.0358 0.9580
Firm 25 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 53,926 61,884 68,355 65,496 63,089 66,571
Wt Prem 119,549 132,131 127,824 140,756 130,499 133,095
Exp Ratio 0.4511 0.4684 0.5348 0.4653 0.4834 0.5002
4Firm 26 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 219,773 258,160 247,358 263,018 264,737 288,474
Wt Prem 222,015 273,102 250,673 242,644 268,167 297,053
Exp Ratio 0.9899 0.9453 0.9868 1.0840 0.9872 0.9711
Firm 27 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 4,713 5,676 5,757 6,387 8,868 10,029
Wt Prem 3,381 6,961 8,793 11,319 17,612 16,323
Exp Ratio 1.3941 0.8154 0.6548 0.5643 0.5035 0.6144
Firm 28 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 43,576 52,136 43,314 43,189 32,862 33,333
Wt Prem 125,800 123,961 52,452 32,616 31,289 36,826
Exp Ratio 0.3464 0.4206 0.8258 1.3242 1.0503 0.9051
Firm 29 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 37,033 31,936 34,124 33,745 35,994 40,577
Wt Prem 43,145 45,497 47,480 45,125 41,424 35,729
Exp Ratio 0.8583 0.7019 0.7187 0.7478 0.8689 1.1357
Firm 30 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 26,103 26,532 28,126 30,675 33,340 35,416
Wt Prem 71,299 65,062 63,234 70,291 72,332 94,971
Exp Ratio 0.3661 0.4078 0.4448 0.4364 0.4609 0.3729
Firm 31 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 7,687 8,332 8,974 9,066 10,412 11,998
Wt Prem 10,504 11,044 11,422 12,834 12,833 11,297
Exp Ratio 0.7318 0.7544 0.7857 0.7064 0.8114 1.0620
Firm 32 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 259,078 304,875 295,038 303,754 360,956 334,964
Wt Prem 720,865 810,359 848,187 872,002 989,737 1,001,944
Exp Ratio 0.3594 0.3762 0.3478 0.3483 0.3647 0.3343
Firm 33 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 6,117 6,883 6,910 7,164 7,095 7,381
Wt Prem 17,029 20,438 18,501 18,134 16,766 17,917
Exp Ratio 0.3592 0.3368 0.3735 0.3951 0.4232 0.4119
Firm 34 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 130,621 135,750 138,918 132,571 144,291 159,019
Wt Prem 125,955 140,188 118,616 134,544 172,408 222,972
Exp Ratio 1.0370 0.9683 1.1712 0.9853 0.8369 0.7132
Firm 35 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 23,123 23,104 25,209 25,161 25,263 28,591
Wt Prem 50,733 44,945 40,209 32,277 25,700 26,560
Exp Ratio 0.4558 0.5141 0.6270 0.7795 0.9830 1.0765
Firm 36 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 75,232 75,291 70,126 80,374 79,932 77,085
Wt Prem 69,423 70,825 78,087 66,737 63,612 60,969
Exp Ratio 1.0837 1.0631 0.8981 1.2043 1.2566 1.2643
Firm 37 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Gen Exp 20,275 22,672 24,166 24,513 26,321 25,324
Wt Prem 17,052 15,109 17,792 13,220 20,244 20,531
Exp Ratio 1.1890 1.5005 1.3582 1.8542 1.3002 1.2334
TABLE II
SOFTWARE INSTALLED BY YEAR
YEAR RDB NETWORK EXPERT WORKFLOW
1984 1 1 0 0
1985 5 2 0 0
1986 3 3 0 0
1987 3 4 1 0
1988 5 2 2 1
1989 3 8 4 2
1990 1 11 2 0
1991 2 3 1 1
1992 2 5 0 2
1993 5 2 2 2
1994 2 1 3 5
1995 2 0 0 8
1996 1 0 4 7
1997 3 0 3 3
1998 1 0 1 1
1999 0 0 1 0
yr unk. 1
40
_1
43 24 32
1996-99 are planned installations 
Table includes all 43 responses
TABLE III
1995 SURVEY OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY COMPARATIVE EXPENSE 
PERFORMANCE SURVEY EXPENSE ALLOWANCES
Drivers Average 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
First year ordinary life 147.8% 138.55 142.40 147.49 148.00 162.39
Renewal ordinary life 7.0 7.41 7.25 6.95 6.97 6.57
Individual annuity 7.8 7.79 7.94 7.75 7.65 8.03
Credit life 24.3 28.72 31.14 20.33 21.95 19.28
Group life 23.0 19.15 23.77 25.71 24.77 21.63
Group annuity 10.2 6.61 6.61 8.37 11.95 17.67
Accident and health group 7.3 6.90 7.15 7.58 7.38 7.73
Accident and health credit 38.3 47.07 45.9 34.10 28.59 35.96
Accident and health other 1st Year 114.5 116.99 112.21 108.98 119.15 115.40
Accident and health other renewal 19.0 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00
Industrial , 7.0
Deposit type and misc. 1.9 1.24 1.24 1.57 2.24 3.31
Accident and health group was based on an average expense allowance on policies for 
25-99 lives and 100-999 lives.
Accident and health other (individual) was based on an average expense allowance for 
medical expense, long term care, and other policies.
Accident and health other renewal was based on an average expense allowance for 
medical expense and other policies.
Industrial (debit insurance) is a minor part of the current market and no specific figures 
were available. Expense allowances for renewal premiums for ordinary life were used.
TABLE IV 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
DUMMY VARIABLES
1. DEsr Early entry, self ranking
2 . DLsr Late entry, self ranking
3 . DESW Early entry, softwares owned
4. DMSW Middle entry, softwares owned
5. DLSW Late entry, softwares owned
6. DEey Early entry, year of first entry
7. DMey Middle entry, year of first entry
8 . DLey Late entry, year of first entry
9. DMESW Early-middle combined, softwares owned
10. DMLSW Late-Middle combined, softwares owned
11. DMEey Early-middle combined, year of first entry
12. DMLey Late-middle combined, year of first entry 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
1. E/WP Expenses to weighted premium ratio
2. AE/WP Change in E/WP
3. 5AE/WP Five year average change in E/WP
4. WP/EMP Weighted premiums per employee
5. WP94/EMP 1994 weighted premiums per employee
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TABLE VI
Descriptive Statistics for Expense/Weighted Premium Ratio
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
DEsr 132 .9629 .4813 .3136 2.4757
DLsr 90 .8494 .3649 .3183 2.4757
DEey 78 1.0212 .4467 .3183 1.8542
DMey 102 .8940 .4835 .3343 1.9607
DLey 42 .7788 .2321 .3136 2.4757
DEsw 54 .9358 .3184 .4511 1.1357
DMsw 90 .9987 .5626 .3136 1.6523
DLsw 78 .8095 .3187 .3343 2.4757
DMEey 180 .9491 .4709 .3136 1.8542
DMEsw 144 .9751 .4853 .3136 2.4757
DMLey 144 .8604 .4282 .3183 2.4757
DMLsw 168 .9108 .4738 .3136 2.4757
All variables 222 .9169 .4405 .3136 2.4757
sr Self ranking
ey Ranked by year of first entry
sw Ranked by number of softwares owned
DE Early entry (aggressive)
DM Middle entry
DL Late entry (conservative)
DME Middle/early combined
DML Middle/late combined
TABLE VII
YEAR AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
EQUATION P t Rz F
E/WP = cc0 + P(YR) + S -.0307 -2.549* .0287 6.497
AE/WP = a 0 + P(YR) + s .0035 .525 .0012 .275
* Significant at 5 %
N = 222
YR = Year of entry into first software
TABLE VIII
SIZE DUMMIES TIMES MEDIUM/AGGRESSIVE DUMMIES
1 . E/W P=a0+ p 1(DMEsw)+P2(MED) + 
P3(LRG) +P4(DSWL)+P5(DSWM)+S
2 . E /W P=a0+P1(DMEYR)+P2(MED) + 
P3(LRG) +p4(DYRL)+P5(DYRM)+e
VARIABLE Coefficient t Coefficient t
Intercept .8988 12.763 .8309 8.193
P, .2454 2.464* .2541 2.170*
P2 -.0756 -0.679 -.0249 -0.155
P3 -.2861 -2.346* -.1573 -0.981
P4 -.2233 -1.553 -.2157 -1.207
P5 .1341 0.882 .0143 0.080
Equation 1: R2 = .101 and F= 4.852
Equation 2: R2 = .068 and F= 3.13 5
* Results are significant at 5%
N = 222
DSWM = Medium dummy x medium/aggressive ranked by software owned 
DSWL = Large dummy X medium/aggressive ranked by softwares owned
D YRM = Medium dummy x medium/aggressive ranked by year of entry 
DYRL = Large dummy X medium/aggressive ranked by year of entry
MED = Medium 
LRG = Large
TABLE IX 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION AND 
MEAN WEIGHTED PREMIUM RATIOS 
by size and aggressiveness
By softwares owned: Conservative Mean Medium/Aggressive Mean
Small 6 .8988 6 1.1441
Medium 4 .8231 9 .8453
Large 3 .6126 9 .9922
By year first installed: Conservative Mean Medium/Aggressive Mean
Small 3 .8309 9 1.0850
Medium 2 .8060 11 .8444
Large 2 .6736 10 .9420
TABLE X
Descriptive Statistics for Size
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Small - Weighted Prem Stats 72 22,966 12,631 3,381 70,374
Med - Weighted Prem Stats 78 76,714 48,431 25,213 296,948
Large - Weighted Prem Stats 72 287,243 235,625 25,969 1,106,992
Small - Exp. Ratio Stats 72 1.0215 .5020 .3368 2.4160
Med - Exp. Ratio Stats 78 .8385 .4235 .3183 2.4757
Large - Exp. Ratio Stats 72 .8973 .3733 .3136 1.6563
DSWM 54 .8453 .4712 .3183 2.4757
DSWL 54 .9922 .3514 .3136 1.6523
DYRM 66 .8444 .4579 .3183 2.4757
DYRL 60 .9420 .3664 .3343 1.6523
DSWM = Medium dummy x medium/aggressive ranked by software owned 
DSWL = Large dummy x medium/aggressive ranked by softwares owned
DYRM — Medium dummy x medium/aggressive ranked by year of entry 
DYRL = Large dummy x medium/aggressive ranked by year of entry
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TABLE XV
Descriptive Statistics for Change in Expense/Weighted Premium Ratio
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
DEsr 132 -.0105 .2497 -1.4885 1.1332
DLsr 90 .0225 .2277 -.7793 .8035
DEey 78 .0007 .1981 -.5540 .8035
DMey 102 -.0063 .3037 -1.4885 1.1332
DLey 42 .0293 .1059 -.2000 .3045
DEsw 54 .0154 .2071 -.5120 .8035
DMsw 90 -.0105 .3165 -1.4885 1.1332
DLsw 78 .0096 .1450 -.5540 .4960
DMEey 180 -.0033 .2625 -1.4885 1.1332
DMEsw 144 -.0008 .2800 -1.4885 1.1332
DMLey 144 .0041 .2620 -1.4885 1.1332
DMLsw 168 -.0012 .2514 -1.4885 1.1332
All variables 222 .0029 .2410 -1.4885 1.1332
sr Self ranking
ey Ranked by year of first entry
sw Ranked by number of softwares owned
E Early entry (aggressive)
M Middle entry 
L Late entry (conservative)
ME Middle/early combined 
ML Middle/late combined
TABLE XVI
Descriptive Statistics for 5 Year Average Change in 
Expense/Weighted Premium Ratio
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
DEsr 22 -.0057 .0718 -.1559 .1241
DLsr 15 .0472 .0941 -.0681 .3480
DEey 13 .0008 .0595 -.1458 .0784
DMey 17 .0192 .1103 -.1559 .3480
DLey 7 .0351 .0490 -.0050 .1241
DEsw 9 .0533 .1399 -.1458 .3480
DMsw 15 -.0023 .0687 -.1559 .1118
DLsw 13 .0106 .0371 -.0681 .0741
DMEey 30 .0113 .0909 -.1559 .3480
DMEsw 24 .0186 .1022 -.1559 .1118
DMLey 24 .0239 .0956 -.1559 .3480
DMLsw 28 .0037 .0557 -.1559 .3480
All variables 37 .0158 .0845 -.1559 .3480
sr Self ranking
ey Ranked by year of first entry
sw Ranked by number of softwares owned
E Early entry (aggressive)
M Middle entry
L Late entry (conservative)
ME Middle/early combined
ML Middle/late combined
TABLE XVII
Descriptive Statistics for Average 5 Year Weighted Premium per Employee
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
DEsr 22 124.9550 92.5398 21.4628 364.3246
DLsr 15 126.4731 83.3592 42.2846 322.6780
DEey 13 113.8155 86.5984 41.3362 364.3246
DMey 15 118.6577 83.9886 21.4628 281.8868
DLey 9 154.7083 99.0001 61.5237 322.6780
DEsw 9 100.2085 67.7092 25.4078 261.2845
DMsw 15 117.4604 83.9318 21.4628 284.5762
DLsw 13 152.4863 102.3251 68.8313 364.3246
DMEey 28 116.4095 83.6465 21.4628 322.6780
DMEsw 24 110.9910 77.1712 21.4628 364.3246
DMLey 24 131.9376 89.5346 21.4628 364.3246
DMLsw 28 133.7224 92.8585 21.4628 284.5762
All variables 37 125.5904 87.7410 21.4628 364.3246
sr Self ranking
ey Ranked by year of first entry
sw Ranked by number of softwares owned
E Early entry (aggressive)
M Middle entry
L Late entry (conservative)
ME Middle/early combined
ML Middle/late combined
TABLE XVIII
Descriptive Statistics for 1994 Weighted Premium per Employee
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
DEsr 22 145.1707 116.9230 14.7304 474.8556
DLsr 15 129.7995 97.2745 46.4116 371.3166
DEey 13 130.6072 112.7001 46.4116 474.8556
DMey 15 124.2488 94.3091 14.7304 323.2078
DLey 9 175.4589 126.7839 49.1859 371.3166
DEsw 9 107.3314 70.6913 37.1620 266.1895
DMsw 15 131.3306 102.7576 14.7304 346.9519
DLsw 13 169.6010 132.8480 77.5069 474.8556
DMEey 28 143.3309 107.9177 14.7304 474.8556
DMEsw 24 149.0990 117.0329 14.7304 346.9519
DMLey 24 127.2009 101.3275 14.7304 371.3166
DMLsw 28 122.3309 91.1390 14.7304 474.8556
All variables 37 138.9393 108.2269 14.7304 474.8556
sr Self ranking
ey Ranked by year of first entry
sw Ranked by number of softwares owned
E Early entry (aggressive)
M Middle entry
L Late entry (conservative)
ME Middle/early combined
ML Middle/late combined
T A B L E  X I X
INDIVIDUAL YEARS DROPPED OUT OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The following table shows the decreasing t and F statistics 
as each additional year of data is dropped out of the 
equation based on the year of entry E/WP=a0+Pi(DMEEY)+e and the 
equation based on the number of softwares owned 
E/WP=a0+Pi(DMEsw)+8.
Year p t F p t F
out (year) (year) (year) (number) (number) (numbe:
1989 . 1670 2 . 056 4 .228 . 1633 2 .463 6 . 065
1990 . 1490 1.756 3.082 . 1519 2.195 4 . 817
1991 . 1303 1.338 1. 791 . 1346 1. 694 2 .869
1992 . 0573 0 .499 0 .249 . 1196 1.282 1. 643
1993 - . 0086 -0.056 0 . 003 . 1153 0 . 929 0 . 863
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